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ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
RUSSELL S. JUTLAHi
The nature of one's perception of an object or event is largely
dependent upon one's own perspective. This assertion also applies
to matters of policy, where characterization of an issue is closely
related to the analytical perspective adopted by the observer. With
respect to legal issues, including environmental concerns, an eco-
nomic approach to the law purports to provide useful insights into
legal systems. This paper seeks to accomplish several objectives.
Section I of this paper justifies the use of economic theory in seek-
ing to understand the law. Sections II and III provide a broad over-
view of both welfare economics and environmental economics.
The primary focus here is on the fundamental economic concept of
social efficiency. Finally, Section IV outlines and attempts to re-
spond to criticisms of economic analysis as it is applied to the law in
general, and environmental law in particular. The central argu-
ment of this paper is that, despite some important criticism, eco-
nomics is a useful analytical approach for environmental issues.
I. UTILITY OF ECONOMICS IN ANALYZING LAw
There are at least three important contributions that econom-
ics can make to legal analysis. First, economics aids legal scholars in
gaining a necessary external perspective on their discipline. 2 Sec-
1. Mr. Russell S. Jutlah has received his B.A. Economics with Distinction, in
addition to two advanced degrees of LL.B. and a LL.M. The author gratefully
acknowledges his thesis supervisor and second reader, Professors Ian Townsend-
Gault and Jutta Brunn6e of the Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia,
respectively, for the very helpful comments and insights in developing his LL.M.
thesis, GREAT LAKES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY- THE ECOsYsTEM APPROACH AND AN EC-
ONOMIC PERSPECTIVE. This paper is largely based on a chapter of that work.
2. See Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSiS OF LAw, 27 (5th ed. 1998) (re-
porting insights of pioneers have been generalized, empirically tested and inte-
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ond, on a normative level, economics helps to explain value con-
flicts by showing how much of one value, specifically efficiency,
must be sacrificed to achieve another value.3 Finally, on a positive
level, economics contributes to an understanding of the underlying
reasons for certain legal decisions and of the economic effects of
specific legal outcomes. 4
A. External Perspective on Law
Economics contributes to legal scholarship by providing schol-
ars with a necessary external perspective. As Werner Hirsch noted,
one point of contact between law and economics involves:
[T] he criticism voiced by some that legal scholars view the
law too much from within - too much in terms of the law's
own logical structure. When the law steps outside itself,
these critics claim, it lacks a well-developed theoretical or
empirical apparatus with which to explore the world
around it. Yet as legal scholars look outside law, they find
that economics has developed paradigms that seem to pro-
vide a powerful analytic framework for the study of law.5
Thus, because the law does not exist in a social vacuum and is actu-
ally only one aspect of a larger social structure, external perspec-
tives provide useful insights to legal scholarship.
The recognition that law is not, and should not be treated as
an autonomous discipline is one of the legacies of legal realism. 6
Legal realism was a dominant legal movement during the 1920s
and 1930s that sought to place the study of law within a broader
grated with insights of "old" law and economics to create economic theory of law
having explanative power and empirical support).
3. See id. (using example of societal goal of preventing crime to illustrate
economist's ability to indicate more efficient ways to reach that goal).
4. See id. (indicating areas of law affected by economic analysis).
5. W. Z. Hirsch, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYsIs 5 (3d ed.
1999) (observing that interactions between lawyers and economists benefit both
sides). Law offers economists interesting problems and "particularistic" thinking.
See id. at 6. At the same time, economics offers law abstractions derived from
microeconomic theory and mathematical economics, making possible the general-
ization of goals, promotion of efficiency and development of legal rules. See id.
"The use of economic and particularly mathematical models can increase the rigor
of legal analysis." Id.
6. See N. Mercuro & S. G. Medema, Schools of Thought in Law and Economics: A
Kuhnian Competition, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 66
(R.P. Malloy & C.K. Braun eds. 1995).
[Vol. XlI: p. I
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social context. 7 The particular attraction of using economics to un-
derstand law stems from the interdependence of the two disci-
plines, which Nicholas Mercuro and Steven Medema succinctly
summarized: "[A] change in law or working rules leads to a change
in the incentive structure which in turn leads to a change in institu-
tional behavior which in turn leads to a change in economic per-
formance."'8 The utility of economics in legal analysis is therefore
premised on the close interconnections between legal and eco-
nomic processes. As outlined below, economics also contributes to
both normative and positive legal analysis.
B. Clarification of Value Conflicts
Although economics cannot claim greater moral authority
than other social scientific approaches, on a normative level, it con-
tributes to the clarification of value conflicts by demonstrating the
inefficiency of particular types of activities. Richard Posner ob-
served "Although the economist cannot tell society whether it
should seek to limit theft, the economist can show that it would be
inefficient to allow unlimited theft and can thus clarify a value con-
flict by showing how much of one value - efficiency - must be sacri-
ficed to achieve another."9 Thus, the focus of economics upon
efficiency is useful in legal analysis because it provides a benchmark
founded on one type of value, efficiency, against which other com-
peting values may be compared. 10 Economics therefore sets forth
one type of measure for balancing competing values.'1 Hence, by
revealing the inefficiency of particular social goals, economics con-
tributes to the overall selection of specific, workable goals.1 2
In addition to contributing to the choice of social objectives,
economics may also demonstrate the inefficiency of the specific
means chosen to achieve those objectives. For example, if society
determines that limiting theft is a desirable objective, economic
7. For an outline of the growth of the American legal realist movement, see
Gary Minda, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CEN-
TURY's END 25-43 (1995).
8. Mercuro & Medema, supra note 6, at 66.
9. Posner, supra note 2, at 27 (illustrating normative aspects of economic the-
ory of law).
10. See id. (noting "many legal doctrines rest on inarticulate gropings toward
efficiency").
11. See id. (finding idea of providing one type of measure to balance compet-
ing values is objective plainly central to law in pluralist society).
12. Demonstration of the inefficiency of particular social goals requires that
economic value can be properly assigned in all relevant contexts. The criticism
that economic valuation is not possible in all relevant circumstances is discussed in
Section IV below.
2001]
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analysis could demonstrate that certain types of measures would
lead to greater prevention at lower costs. 13 As Posner notes, this
denotes a normative contribution because "[i]f the more efficient
methods did not impair any other values, they would be socially
desirable even if efficiency were low on the totem pole of social
values."1 4 Thus, economics can assist in resolving value conflicts by
focusing on efficiency and thereby providing a frame of reference
for the assessment of competing social objectives and the means to
achieve those objectives.
C. Explanation of Legal Decisions
In addition to its general analytical and normative contribu-
tions, economic analysis of law also plays a positive role by attempt-
ing to explain legal rules and outcomes without seeking to change
them or to make them better.15 In asserting that many areas of the
law "bear the stamp of economic reasoning," Posner noted that:
[g]ranted, few judicial opinions contain explicit refer-
ences to economic concepts. But often the true grounds
of legal decision are concealed rather than illuminated by
the characteristic rhetoric of opinions. Indeed, legal edu-
cation consists primarily of learning to dig beneath the
rhetorical surface to find those grounds, many of which
may turn out to have an economic character. 16
Legal rules and outcomes very often directly affect the manner in
which parties' resources are allocated.17 Thus, it seems logical that
the law may promote or, at least, be consistent with economic con-
cerns; and it surely may be illuminated by economic analysis.
Positive economic analysis can illuminate the legal system at
several levels.' 8 First, with respect to the common law, economic
13. See Posner, supra note 2, at 27 (finding normative economic analysis as
means by which society attempts to expose certain goals as inefficient and reveal
availability of greater prevention at lower costs through different methods).
14. Id. (explaining normative and positive aspects of this theory and that true
grounds of legal opinions are often concealed by rhetoric of opinions).
15. See id.
16. Id. Posner further stated that "[i]t would not be surprising to find many
legal doctrines rest on inarticulate groupings toward efficiency, especially since so
many legal doctrines date back to the nineteenth century when laissez - faire ideol-
ogy, based on classical economics was the dominant ideology of the educated clas-
ses." Id.
17. See id. (noting not every common law doctrine or legal decision is, or pro-
motes efficiency; but common law is still system for maximizing wealth of society).
18. See Posner, supra note 2, at 28 (introducing role of positive economic anal-
ysis of law).
[Vol. XII: p. I
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analysis of legal doctrine and judicial reasoning can demonstrate
the considerable extent to which particular areas are permeated by
economic concerns.19 For example, in highlighting the parallels
between legal and economic considerations, Posner observed that
resolution of many private legal disputes requires consideration of
the future impact of the decision, including its impact on the fre-
quency of accidents and the costs of precautions. 20 Second, posi-
tive economic analysis can focus on the institutional features of the
legal system, for example, to explain the allocation of law enforce-
ment responsibilities between the public and private sectors. 21 Fi-
nally, positive economic analysis can provide insights into the
estimation or prediction of behavioral responses to a change in the
legal environment. 22 As Hirsch observed, economic analysis can
make major contributions in providing answers to such questions
including the likely effects of a proposed law, the effects of an ex-
isting law, and whether its objectives were met.23
In sum, economics can contribute to our understanding of law
in three important respects: (1) by providing a necessary external
perspective; (2) by clarifying value conflicts through demonstrating
the inefficiency of particular types of activities; and (3) by explain-
ing legal rules, outcomes and institutions, and facilitating empirical
analysis. Welfare economics is one of the primary disciplines from
which economic analysis of law has been drawn. 24 Section I pro-
19. See id. at 27 (noting that "many areas of law, especially but not only the
great common law fields of property, torts, crimes, and contracts, bear the stamp
of economic reasoning").
20. See id. at 28. Posner explains that the dichotomy between lawyers and
economists is overstated because the economist is interested in the future effect of
the case to establish a rule for people engaged in dangerous activities, while the
lawyer wants to establish precedent for future cases. See id. Posner also notes,
"[o]nce the frame of reference is expanded beyond the immediate parties to the
case,justice and fairness assume broader meanings than what is just or fair for this
plaintiff and this defendant. The issue becomes what is a just and fair result for a
class of activities." Id.
21. See id. at 27 (noting that statutory or constitutional fields, as opposed to
common law fields, are less likely to promote efficiency and are still likely to be
effected by economic concerns and economic analysis).
22. See W.Z. Hirsch, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 8 (2d
ed. 1988) (providing analogy to criminal law stating that if society insisted that
punishment provide deterrence and retribution through incarceration, and not
merely deterrence, analyst will be forced to reach different efficiency conclusions
about criminal justice system).
23. See id. (noting little evidence that economists or lawyers are particularly
well qualified to select most appropriate objective functions and that many econo-
mists have tunnel vision since they find it more agreeable to engage in partial
equilibrium analysis rather than general equilibrium analysis.)
24. See S.K. Nath, A PERSPECTIVE OF WELFARE ECONOMICS 11 (1973) (explain-
ing "welfare" means well-being or happiness and that statement about what will
2001]
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vides an overview of welfare economic theory and, in particular,
strives to highlight the centrality of the concept of social efficiency.
The concept of social efficiency, as outlined in Section III, is funda-
mental to environmental economics.
II. WELFARE ECONOMIC THEORY
According to S. K. Nath, welfare economics involves the study
of "the possible effects of various economic policies on the welfare
of a society."25 A central concern of welfare economics is how to
attain a socially efficient or optimal allocation of scarce resources
within an economy.2 6 Thus, welfare economists are concerned with
developing models and prescribing measures to achieve an efficient
outcome. 27 In contrast to the normative nature of welfare econom-
ics, the other main branch of economics, positive economics, ad-
dresses questions of measuring the economic impact of changes in
several economic variables.28
Within welfare economics, the objective of maximizing social
welfare requires a social welfare function, a general statement of
the factors that affect the well-being of a society as well as approxi-
mate relative weighting of those objectives. 29 It is important to note
that the variables of a social welfare function are those economic
conditions that affect welfare either directly or indirectly and
increase, decrease or maintain person's or group's welfare is not only descriptive,
but also persuasive and suggestive of recommendation).
25. Id. Nath further suggests the study of welfare economics inherently in-
volves making policy recommendations to contribute to the welfare of a society.
See id. "Any statement which implies a recommendation can be shown to be based
on at least one ethical (or value) judgment. An ethical value judgment can be
defined to be any statement which states or implies that something is desirable (or
undesirable!) and which is not derived from any technical or objective data but
instead from considerations of ultimate value, i.e. ethical considerations." Id.
26. See P. Bohm, SOCIAL EFFICIENCY- A CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO WELFARE
ECONOMICS ix (2d ed. 1987). The term "scarce resources" refers to the limited
availability of virtually all entities valued by economic agents within an economy.
See id. Hence, the term implies tradeoffs or choices between competing uses of
such entities. See id.
27. See id. (discussing how welfare economics attempts to arrive at socially effi-
cient solutions to resource allocation problems of national (or local) economy).
28. See Nath, supra note 24, at 25. Nath notes that a strict concept of social
welfare function is only used for abstract and pedagogic purposes. See id. Specifi-
cally, for setting the general conditions of social welfare to be at a maximum, and
for illustrating the derivation of these conditions with the help of algebra, set the-
ory, geometry, and other math, in the process of teaching. See id.
29. See id. Nath's simplified definition differs from a more strict definition of
a social welfare function. See id. Specifically, Nath states "a relation between social
welfare as the dependent variable and a number of independent variables which
determine social welfare." Id.
[Vol. XII: p. I
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through their impact on political, cultural and other non-economic
conditions. 30 In essence, a social welfare function may be inter-
preted as a kind of rule for ranking alternative social states.3' The
significance of the social welfare function is that a proposition re-
garding any kind of ideal economic arrangement in a society can-
not be formulated without implicit or explicit reliance on a social
welfare function. 32 Clearly, there are considerable difficulties in
constructing social welfare functions and translating them into
practical guidance for economic policy. For present purposes, how-
ever, the key point is that a statement stating the objectives of social
policy is necessary before any rules for optimality can begin to be
formulated. 33
The concept of social efficiency or optimality is fundamental to
welfare economics because it is the discipline's central objective.3 4
A "social optimum" may be defined in general terms as the distribu-
tion of wealth, leisure and other relevant things that maximize so-
cial welfare within a given period according to a well-defined social
welfare function and subject to technical and other relevant con-
straints. 35 Although ethical judgments underpin conceptualization
of all social welfare functions, there is virtual unanimity within mod-
ern welfare economics in viewing social welfare as dependent on
individuals' well being or "utility."3 6 More specifically, welfare
economists almost all agree that social welfare is improved if at least
30. See id. at 26 (warning that welfare economics is not concerned with idea of
"economic welfare").
31. See id. at 27 (noting alternative interpretation of social welfare function as
"master-ordering").
32. See id. at 25 (describing "social welfare function" as concept of fundamen-
tal importance in welfare economics).
33. See E.J. Mishan, Welfare Criteria: Resolution of a Paradox, in ECONOMY EnFi-
CIENCY AND SOCIAL WELFARE: SELECTED ESSAYS ON FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS OF THE
ECONOMIC THEORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE 33 (1981). Mishan describes the idea of a
"social welfare function" as a "pleasing and nebulous abstraction" and lists several
obstacles to its construction, including: the ambiguousness in compiling and ar-
ranging the welfare of each individual in society, the difficulty in discovering the
effect of alternative arrangements on the welfare of each individual in a society
and the cost of such a discovery. Id.; see also Nath, supra note 24, at 30.
34. See Mishan, supra note 33, at 35. The terms "social efficiency" and "op-
timality" are synonymous in this paper.
35. See id. Mishan states, "[s] ocial Optimum, in practice, may not be an ar-
rangement which can be claimed or proved to maximize social welfare during a
period, but rather one which seems to be about the best arrangement from the
standpoint of social welfare according to about as refined a statement of the social
objectives as the policy-makers can be expected to formulate - a statement which is
usually likely to be well short of a well-defined social welfare function." Id.; see also
Nath, supra note 24, at 30.
36. See Mishan, supra note 33, at 36 (noting that individuals judge their own
utility levels); see also Nath, supra note 24, at 36.
2001]
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one person's situation is improved and no person's situation is
worsened.3 7 This type of improvement in social welfare is called a
"Pareto improvement."38 Thus, a Pareto optimal allocation of re-
sources is achieved when no person can be made better off without
making someone else worse off.39
The Paretian conception of optimality is almost universally ac-
cepted by welfare economists as the appropriate conceptual foun-
dation for evaluating alternative allocations. 40 Nicholas Rescher
argued that:
[t]here is little that economists of different schools and
persuasions agree on almost universally, but the Pareto
Principle seems to be among the few exceptions to this
rule. Virtually without exception, economists, decision
theorists, social-choice theoreticians, and the like, are in-
clined to espouse it as a well-nigh self-evident truth. It is
viewed as so secure in itself as to qualify as a touchstone by
which the adequacy of social-choice mechanisms can be
assessed. 41
Thus, within welfare economics, Pareto optimality represents a so-
cially efficient allocation of resources and the ideal against which
alternative allocations may be assessed. 42
It is clear that the Pareto criterion, which excludes changes in
welfare that adversely affect someone's interests, is virtually impossi-
ble to meet in practice given the expansive range of interests in a
pluralist society.43 Therefore, if the Pareto criterion were strictly
applied and only those policy changes yielding Pareto improve-
37. See Mishan, supra note 33, at 36 (using Paretian social welfare to define
Paretian optimal allocation).
38. See Posner, supra note 2, at 14. The "Pareto improvement" is also referred
to as the "Pareto-superior transaction." See id.
39. See id. (explaining goal as achieving unanimity of all affected persons).
40. See Mishan, supra note 33, at 35 (explaining Paretian optima); see also N.
Rescher, Economics Versus Moral Philosophy: The Pareto Principle as a Case Study, in
UNPOPULAR ESSAYS ON TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS 69 (1980).
41. Rescher, supra note 40, at 69 (defining "Pareto improvement" and "Pareto
optimal" as "key components").
42. See id. at 69-70. It is essential to note that different distributions of re-
sources (and hence utility levels) among the individual members of the society
result in different Paretian optima. See id. at 70. Furthermore, the Paretian con-
cept of social improvement (i.e. that the community is better off when at least one
person is better off and no one is worse off) does not enable someone to choose
between two Paretian optima. See id. at 71.
43. See id. at 71-72 (noting that rational person's preference is for his/her
own gain, but it is possible and desirable that that person be concerned also with
welfare of others).
[Vol. XII: p. I
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ments, or solely positive effects, were implemented, policy decisions
would be severely biased towards the status quo since very few
would meet the criterion. Consequently, the response of welfare
economists and policy analysts is to evaluate competing policy alter-
natives on the basis of potential Pareto improvements. 44 The less
demanding criterion of potential Pareto improvement, known as
the Kaldor-Hicks principle, merely requires that aggregate welfare
gains exceed aggregate welfare losses. 45 Thus, in theory, if the
"gainers" are able to compensate the "losers" and still remain better
off, the proposed policy change is desirable under the Kaldor-Hicks
principle as increasing social welfare. As discussed in greater detail
in Section IV(i) (b) below, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion does not re-
quire that compensation actually be paid for an increase in social
welfare.
It is important to note that, although the Kaldor-Hicks princi-
ple constitutes the practical evaluative criterion of many welfare ec-
onomic analyses, the Pareto principle provides the theoretical
foundation for the criterion. 46
Given certain stringent and unlikely assumptions, standard wel-
fare economic theory demonstrates that the necessary conditions
for Pareto optimality are satisfied by a competitive economy in equi-
librium. 47 In essence, the major part of the conditions that must be
fulfilled to achieve Pareto optimality, and hence social efficiency,
are efficient production and efficient consumption. Specifically,
the allocation of commodities in the economy should be such that,
first, in producing goods, it should be impossible for one producer
to be able to convert an additional unit of one good into another at
a rate different than another producer of those goods (i.e. equal
"marginal rates of transformation"), and second, in consuming
goods, no consumer should be more willing than another con-
44. See Posner, supra note 2, at 15. The "Pareto improvement" is also referred
to as the "Pareto-superior transaction." Nine times out of ten an economist is re-
ferring to the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency test, not the Pareto superiority definition of
efficiency. See id. at 14-15.
45. See id. at 14-15. The Kaldor-Hicks principle is also known as wealth max-
imization or potential Pareto superiority. See id. The concept looks at the effects
on third parties. See id.
46. See id. (discussing theoretical applications of use of Pareto theory and fre-
quent use of Kaldor-Hicks by practicing economists).
47. See Nath, supra note 24, at 37 (stating "a perfectly competitive economy at
equilibrium, given some unrealistic assumptions, satisfies the necessary conditions
for Paretian optimum"); see also Bohm, supra note 26, at 19 (discussing criteria
needed to achieve perfect market economy and concluding "in a Pareto optimum
attained in a (perfect) market economy, the price of each product must be equal
to its marginal cost [e.g. economic equilibrium]").
2001]
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sumer to sacrifice more of one good for another good (i.e. equal
"marginal rates of substitution") .4 8 However, the important point
for the present discussion about welfare economics is the assump-
tions or conditions that underlie the analysis.49
The assumptions or conditions for a perfectly competitive mar-
ket are that: (1) all individuals aim to maximize their utility; (2) all
firms maximize profits, including adoption of least-cost methods of
production; (3) all economic agents are rational; (4) all economic
agents have perfect knowledge about the future and about relevant
present activities; (5) all economic agents are free to adjust the
amount of sales and purchases that they would make and the
amount of work they would like to do; (6) no externalities exist; (7)
markets come to equilibrium at stable prices at which there is no
excess demand or supply; (8) the number of companies is variable;
and (9) neither producers nor consumers are able to affect market
prices.50 Thus, the assumptions or conditions necessary for a per-
fect competitive market relate to both behavioral features of partici-
pants and institutional aspects of the economy.
As the discussion above has sought to highlight, the normative
goal of welfare economic theory is to maximize social welfare, mea-
sured by the private welfare of each individual in society. 51 Further-
more, as noted above, it is well settled within welfare economics
that a perfect competitive market maximizes social welfare, or
achieves a Pareto optimum, through a socially efficient allocation of
resources. 52 The existence of a perfect competitive market, and
thus the socially efficient allocation of resources, requires the fulfill-
ment of several heuristic behavioral and institutional assump-
48. SeeJ. Hirshleifer & A. Glazer, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, 449-50 (5th
ed. 1992).
49. In this paper no attempt is made to present the technical analysis leading
to the conclusions about the central significance of equal marginal rates of trans-
formation and substitution, or to the broader conclusion that the necessary condi-
tions for Pareto optimality are met at a competitive equilibrium. Such a discussion
may be found in any number of standard or introductory texts on welfare econom-
ics. See e.g. Bohm, supra note 26, at 2-19; Hirsch, supra note 5, at 214-15.
50. See Nath, supra note 24, at 36-37 (laying out conditions for perfectly com-
petitive market). In essence, an "externality" is a cost or benefit that is imposed or
conferred by one economic agent on another as an incidental result of the former
agent's activities. See id. The concept of externalities is discussed in greater detail
in Section III below.
51. See Richard L. Revesz, FOUNDATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 3
(1997) (introducing economics perspective normative goal).
52. See Nath, supra note 24, at 36 (stating "from a Paretian social welfare func-
tion follows the definition of a Paretian optimal allocation of society's resources -
namely, one which can be altered only by increasing the utility of some individual
at the expense of the utility of others").
[Vol. XII: p. I
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tions.53 However, as economists and policy-makers plainly realize,
these necessary conditions for a perfect competitive market very
rarely, if ever, exist in practice.5 4 One reason for the failure to at-
tain a socially optimal allocation of resources involves the existence
of externalities, a practical reality which runs contrary to assump-
tion six as noted above. 55 As Section III will illustrate, the concept
of externalities is fundamental to the economic analysis of environ-
mental issues and is central to the field of environmental
economics.
III. EXTERNALITIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS
As noted above, one important reason why markets fail to facil-
itate efficient allocation of resources is the existence of externali-
ties. 56 Before discussing the content of the concept of externalities,
it is important to understand its centrality to environmental policy.
As Krister Hjalte, Karl Lidgren and Ingemar Stahl stated: "[m] any,
or perhaps most of the environmental issues that have been dis-
cussed in the past few years can be analyzed in terms of externalities
or in terms of the price system's failure to convey correct informa-
tion about a resource's relative scarcity."5 7 In short, externalities
are a significant cause of market failure.58 Thus, the concept of
externalities seems to form an important theoretical basis for envi-
ronmental policy prescriptions.
Despite the centrality of externalities to environmental eco-
nomics, the issue of precisely defining the concept of externalities
is the subject of some debate. 59 An externality exists when not all of
53. See id.
54. See N. Hanley et al., ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
22-56 (1997) (analyzing market failure for environmental resources).
55. See Krister Hjalte et al., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND WELFARE ECONOMICS
7-8 (1977) (discussing externalities as unpredictable). Although Hjalte's comment
was made more than two decades ago, it remains apt today.
56. See id. at 7-9 (asserting that social efficiency is arguably threatened by ex-
ternalities and that there is no definite answer to this problem).
57. Id. at 8.
58. See Hanley et al., supra note 54, at 29-37; see also M.A. Santos, LIMITS AND
SCOPE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 62-64 (1995) (noting that environmental problems
are not caused by any single factor, but are result of several areas of neglect).
Three factors have played a role in the environmental crises: 1) the prescriptive
nature of environmental values, 2) growth and attitudes, and 3) the fact that soci-
ety is not maximizing the benefits of fundamental economic and scientific princi-
ples. See id.
59. See W.J. Baumol & W.E. Oates, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 14
(2d ed. 1988) (citing, in part, F.M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, LXXII
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 351, 351-79 (1958)); see generally J.E. Meade,
External Economies and Diseconomies in a Competitive Situation, LXII ECONOMIC JOUR-
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the implications or costs of a consumption or production activity
are fully borne by the person undertaking the activity. 60 William
Baumol and Wallace Oates stated that "[a]n externality is present
whenever some individual's (for example, A's) utility or production
relationships include real (that is, non-monetary) variables, whose
values are chosen by others (persons, corporations, governments)
without particular attention to the effects on A's welfare."61 Thus,
an externality involves the imposition of a cost or the conferral of a
benefit on an economic agent as an incidental result of the activi-
ties of another economic agent.62
A few examples of externalities may serve more fully to illumi-
nate their character. Some pervasive and serious examples include
the following:
a. Disposal of toxic wastes;
b. Sulfur dioxide, particulates, and other contaminants of
the atmosphere;
c. Various degradable and nondegradable wastes that
pollute the world's waterways;
d. Pesticides, which, through various routes, become
imbedded in food products;
e. Deterioration of neighborhoods into slums;
f. Congestion along urban highways; and
g. High noise levels in metropolitan areas.63
NAL 54 (1952);J.E. Meade, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC EXTERNALITIES 15-23 (1973).
At this point, the definitional issue will not be explored in any detail because the
primary concern here is to delineate the concept in broad terms and to explain in
greater detail its relevance to environmental policy.
60. See Hirsch, supra note 5, at 14 (stating, "[T]echnically, one individual's
(household's, government's or firm's) consumption can enter into another's util-
ity (or production) function without proper market compensation because of im-
perfect appropriation of entitlement or rights.").
61. Baumol & Oates, supra note 59, at 17. Baumol & Oates' definition is con-
ditioned on the absence of regulatory pressures for the control of activity. See id.
They conclude that the threat of government intervention can force the polluter
to concern himself with the effects on emissions, but they do not say that those
concerns disqualify those emissions as an externality. See id. at 17 n.10.
62. See id. at 17. This definition rules out situations where someone deliberately
acts to affect another person's welfare. As Baumol and Oates stated, "[i]f I pur-
posely maneuver my car to splatter mud on a pedestrian whom I happen to dislike,
he is given no choice in the amount of mud he 'consumes,' but one would not
normally regard this as an externality." Id. at 17.
63. See id. at 12 (citing various common examples of externalities).
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Each of these examples reflects the essential nature of externalities,
that is, the failure to incorporate fully the social costs, or broader
affected interests into a cost calculation or decision. 64
The failure to incorporate all social costs into an economic de-
cision has significant, often detrimental, ramifications for social
welfare. Generally, the impact of the activity on others may result
in a divergence of the private costs of the person undertaking the
activity from the full social costs. In essence, the person undertak-
ing the activity disregards, through self-interest or ignorance, the
negative impact of his or her activities on others. The result is that
the person continues the activity up to a privately optimal level. In
other words, the person continues to act until it yields no further
net benefit to them regardless of the fact that, at some reduced
level of activity, the welfare of the community is maximized.65
With respect to environmental issues, the divergence of private
costs and social costs is reflected in environmental degradation,
such as excessive pollution, and, more generally, in a failure to
achieve the socially optimal allocation of resources. 66 From an eco-
nomic perspective, at the root of the externality is the absence of an
exchange institution in which the polluter pays an appropriate
64. See Hirsch, supra note 5, at 14-15 (discussing several classes of externalities
distinguished in economic literature); see also Baumol & Oates, supra note 59, at
18-21 (noting both public and private externalities as two broad classes). The es-
sence of the distinction between these two classes of externalities relates to the
depletability of the external costs. See id. at 18. Public externalities are "undeplet-
able" in the sense that an increase in the number of people suffering from the
external costs will not reduce the average impact of those costs. See id. at 19. Ex-
amples of environmental externalities that take a public (undepletable) form are
polluted air and water, and noise and neighborhood slums. See id. at 20. In con-
trast, private externalities are "depletable" because the external costs are divisible
among the individuals upon whom they are imposed. See id. One example of a
private (depletable) externality, noted by Baumol and Oates, is the case of coal
spilled from passing trains that is gathered by fuel-needy individuals. See id. This is
a private externality because the total quantity of coal available is reduced with
every additional piece found by a gatherer. Such practical examples of private
environmental externalities are rare. See id. Thus, environmental externalities can
take either a public (undepletable) or a private (depletable) form. However, be-
cause the basic policy prescription is the same for public and private externalities
and as a result of the rarity of the latter type of externality, this paper does not
distinguish between the two cases while discussing the concept of externalities. See
id at 18-21.
65. See Hirsch, supra note 5, at 265 (noting that when parties to transactions
generate externalities, but they fail to consider their implications in making deci-
sions, optimal resource allocation is unlikely).
66. See Hjalte et al., supra note 55, at 5-7 (contending that for price system to
function effectively, it must encompass all factors of production process). The
price system fails to convey the relative scarcity of environmental resources. See id.
at 7.
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price for imposing the external costs. 6 7 Therefore, based on eco-
nomic theory, the fundamental policy issue facing those seeking to
restore or to achieve the socially optimal allocation of resources is
how to ensure that external costs are internalized. 68 As some com-
mentators have observed: "[T]he efficient resolution of environ-
mental externalities calls for polluting agents to face a cost at the
margin for their polluting activities equal to the value of the dam-
ages they produce and for victims to select their own levels of defen-
sive activities with no compensation from polluters." 69 Thus, within
the context of environmental protection, the objective is to achieve
a socially optimal allocation of resources by ensuring that polluters,
and others whose activities may adversely affect environmental qual-
ity, bear the full costs that their activities may impose. 70
Based upon this theoretical foundation, environmental eco-
nomics seeks to develop a number of policy prescriptions aimed at
contributing to environmental policy.71 Although the degree of re-
liance and choice of economic instruments varies considerably be-
tween countries, the underlying idea of the policy prescriptions is
essentially the introduction of surrogate prices to provide the neces-
sary allocative incentives. 72
67. See Hanley et al., supra note 54, at 29; see also, Sharon Beder, Charging the
Earth: The Promotion of Pice-based Measures for Pollution Control, 16 ECOLOGICAL Eco-
NOMICS 53 (1996) (noting that environmental resources such as timber, fish and
minerals are bought and sold in market but that their price does not include dam-
age to environment and therefore they are overused or abused because they are so
cheap).
68. See Beder, supra note 67, at 52-53 (describing economists' approach that
externalities not taken into account in market transactions should be "internal-
ized" so that firm causing external cost is obliged to pay for it).
69. M.L. Cropper & W.E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey XXX J.
ECON. LlIaO. 675, 681 (1992), reproduced in Oates, THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMEN-
TAL REGULATION, 381, 387 (1996) (summarizing and assessing work that environ-
mental economists did regarding polluting activities regulations and
environmental amenities valuations).
70. See generally, Beder, supra note 67, at 52-53 (describing economic argu-
ment that subjecting use of environmental resources to price-based measures is
most effective means of dealing with environmental problems).
71. See Cropper & Oates, supra note 69, at 675-76 (noting that economists
have suggested unit taxes, effluent fees or marketable emission rights as means to
regulate pollution).
72. See id. at 675. For a comparative table listing various federal environmen-
tally-related taxes and charges in member countries of the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD), see OECD, EVALUATING ECONOMIC
INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, 20-22 (1997). For a discussion of the
potential use of economic instruments to address toxic pollution within the Great
Lakes region, see Hickling Corporation, Economic Instruments For the Virtual Elimina-
tion of Persistent Toxic Substances in the Great Lakes Basin, Report prepared for Inter-
nationalJoint Commission (IJC) (1994). For an ecologically economic perspective
on the ways in which the theory and application of economic instruments is
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It is important to note that elimination of an externality will
not result in abatement of all pollution.7 3 Some pollution will oc-
cur even at a socially optimal allocation of resources, notwithstand-
ing the absence of external costs. Pollution, and other forms of
environmental degradation, are generally incidental results of prof-
itable economic activity. From an economic perspective, a decrease
in pollution is socially advantageous only if it increases the welfare
of victims of pollution by more than the corresponding decrease in
the welfare of those causing the pollution. Therefore, even a so-
cially efficient allocation of resources involves some degree of
pollution.74
In sum, as the foregoing discussion strives to highlight, envi-
ronmental economic theory provides a prescriptive and descriptive
framework for addressing environmental degradation. The pre-
scriptive aspect of environmental economics is the goal of maximiz-
ing social welfare, including allowance of a socially optimal level of
pollution. Its descriptive feature is that environmental degradation,
including excessive pollution, occurs when social costs diverge from
private costs for any number of reasons related to market failure,
particularly the existence of externalities. Furthermore, environ-
mental economics prescribes several forms of economic instru-
ments aimed at achieving efficient use of resources through the
introduction of appropriate pricing signals. It is now relevant to
outline environmental economics and its conceptual foundations,
and to strive to address some criticisms that have been levied
against these frameworks. Section IV undertakes this objective.
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
7 5
A. Criteria for Social Efficiency - The Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks
Principles
1. Pareto Principle
As noted above, the Pareto principle is almost universally ac-
cepted by economists as a "touchstone by which the adequacy of
shaped by the interests, values and ideologies of their proponents see generally,
Beder, supra note 67.
73. See Revesz, supra note 51, at 3.
74. See id. Under the economic perspective, having less pollution may be just
as unwanted as having more pollution. Thus, a socially optimal amount of pollu-
tion is a delicate balance between the welfare of the victims and the welfare of the
polluters. See id.
75. One area of study that has criticized both "mainstream" economics,
particularly environmental economics, and ecology is ecological economics. Apart
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social-choice mechanisms can be assessed." 76 Some commentators
criticize the Pareto principle as an unjustified measure of social wel-
fare.77 First, critics of the Paretian approach to social welfare argue
that the approach is founded on the untenable presupposition that
individuals choose between competing social states on the basis of
"blindered self-interest." 78 Thus, critics argue, the economic ap-
from the introduction to the discipline provided here, this paper will not
independently examine the critiques by students of ecological economics, but
rather will include ecological economic criticisms with the others outlined in
Section III. As Robert Costanza stated in the inaugural issue of Ecological Economics:
Environmental and resource economics, as it is currently practiced,
covers only the application of neoclassical economics to environmental
and resource problems. Ecology, as it is currently practiced, sometimes
deals with human impacts on ecosystems, but the more common
tendency is to stick to "natural" systems. [Ecological Economics] is
intended to be a new approach to both ecology and economics that
recognizes the need to make economics more cognizant of ecological
impacts and dependencies; the need to make ecology more sensitive to
economic forces, incentives, and constraints; and the need to treat
integrated economic-ecologic systems with a common (but diverse) set of
conceptual and analytical tools. [Italics in original]
Robert Costanza, What is Ecological Economics? 1 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1, 1 (1989).
Thus, ecological economics seeks to develop a new analytical framework by focus-
ing on the intersection of the disciplines of ecology and economics. See C.J.
Cleaveland, Basic Principles and Evolution of Ecological Economics, in THE INSTITUTE
FOR RESEARCH ON ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY& THE CANADIAN INTERNA-
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: EMERGENCE OF A NEW DE-
VELOPMENT PARADIGM 30 (Proedit Cassette ed., 1993). For a discussion of the
methodological and conceptual issues of ecological economics, see generally Malt
Faber et al., ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: CONCEPTS AND METHODS (1996). Although
the conceptual foundations of this evolving discipline will, perhaps, emerge with
greater clarity in the future, some commentators seek to distinguish ecological eco-
nomics from neoclassical economics. See, e.g., Costanza et al., AN INTRODUCTION To
ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS (1997). They want to distinguish between the two on the
basis that in addition to the neoclassical goal of efficient allocation, ecological eco-
nomics sets the goals of limiting economic activities to a sustainable scale and of
fair distribution. Specifically:
We see three basic problems: allocation, distribution, and scale. Neoclas-
sical economics deals extensively with allocation, secondarily with distri-
bution, and not at all with scale. Ecological economics deals with all of
these, and accepts much of neoclassical theory regarding allocation. Our
emphasis on the scale question is made necessary by its neglect in stan-
dard economics. Inclusion of scale is the biggest difference between eco-
logical economics and neoclassical economics. . . .It is clear that scale
should not be determined by prices, but by a social decision reflecting
ecological limits. Distribution should not be determined by prices, but by
a social decision reflecting a just distribution of assets.
Id. at 80-81; see also INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION (IJC), 1995-1997 PRIORITIES
AND PROGRESS UNDER THE GREAT LAKES WATER QuALIry AGREEMENT 34 (1997)
(comparing ecological and neoclassical economics).
76. Rescher, supra note 40, at 69.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 71. "Blindered Self-Interest" is only one alternative discussed by
Rescher, when taking a closer examination of "the Tacit Presupposition." Id. Case
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proach to social welfare leads to the questionable conclusion that
widening disparities in levels of well being are socially rational and
desirable. 79 Second, critics of the Pareto principle argue that, al-
though transitive reasoning implies that successive improvements in
total welfare are preferable, such reasoning cannot be used to jus-
tify increasing disparities in welfare.8 0 Rather, critics assert that a
sense of justice, involving at least some modicum of egalitarianism,
fatally undermines the position that Pareto improvements are al-
ways desirable, even if they result in further disparities in welfare.81
Thus, critics of the Pareto principle conclude that the principle un-
justifiably subordinates other important, competing principles,
such as distributive justice and egalitarianism.8 2 Moreover, critics
contend that highlighting and combining competing principles re-
lating to social welfare involves precisely the underlying issues that
should be addressed, rather than using them to judge undefended
presuppositions, such as the Pareto principle.8 3
The criticism above, that the Pareto principle is unjustified as
the ultimate criterion of social welfare because it ignores important
ethical issues, is not new.8 4 It is recognized within the fields of wel-
fare economics and Law and Economics as a valid concern.8 5 Pos-
ner acknowledged that:
[t]he dependence of even the Pareto-superiority concept
of efficiency on the distribution of wealth - willingness to
pay, and hence value, being a function of that distribution
1, or "Blindered Self-Interest," asks whether one would like to have an alternative
that gives them the return x or return y, when no information about how others
fare is given to that person. See id. On the other hand, case #2, or the "Holistically
Construed Communal Interest," allows one to have a certain distribution across a
whole population (they receive return x) or one that gives them variant distribu-
tion (and they receive return y). Id. (emphasis added).
79. See id. at 72.
80. See id. (questioning whether it really improves matters to let ever wider
disparities open up between hapless many and fortunate few).
81. See Rescher, supra note 40, at 73 (claiming that there remains that part of
the "sense of justice" which involves at least modicum of egalitarianism, even in
absence of preferability). Rescher goes on to contend that it is necessary to look at
picture of social-preferability assessment of utility distribution in both a micro-
scopic as well as macroscopic regard. See id.
82. See id. at 77 (claiming that putting Pareto Principle into controlling posi-
tion requires us to maintain that conflicting principles of distributive justice and
egalitarianism should be discounted or subordinated to it).
83. See id. (stating that these difficult issues cannot simply be brushed aside).
84. See Nath, supra note 24, at 65-69 (discussing flaws of assumptions underly-
ing Paretian welfare economics, and need for inclusion of ethical judgements in
concept of social optimum).
85. See Posner, supra note 2, at 15 (discussing absence of ethical considera-
tions in Pareto Principle analysis).
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- further limits efficiency as an ultimate criterion of the
social good. If income and wealth were distributed differ-
ently, the pattern of demands might also be different and
efficiency would require a different deployment of our ec-
onomic resources. Economics does not answer the ques-
tion whether the existing distribution of income and
wealth is good or bad, just or unjust, although it can tell us
a great deal about the costs of altering the existing distri-
bution, as well as about the distributive consequences of
various policies; neither does it answer the ultimate ques-
tion whether an efficient allocation of resources would be
socially or ethically desirable. [Footnotes omitted.] 86
Thus, the Pareto Principle optimality is limited by its inability to
resolve distributive equity issues, which, as critics argue, requires
balancing with other principles.8 7
Notwithstanding this limitation, however, Pareto optimality can
offer valuable insights into the efficiency of an economy.88 Further-
more, as argued in Section I, in focusing on efficiency as one im-
portant value of a society, economics can contribute to the
clarification of value conflicts by providing a frame of reference for
the assessment of competing social objectives as well as means to
achieve those objectives. Therefore, despite the limitations of eco-
nomics in providing ethical guidance on issues of distributive eq-
uity, the discipline still makes an important contribution to
normative as well as positive issues.
2. Kaldor-Hicks Principle
In addition to attacks on the Pareto principle, critics challenge
economists' reliance on the Kaldor-Hicks principle. Kaldor-Hicks
requires that any change result in a positive net benefit to society.8 9
86. Id. at 15 (discussing limits of efficiency as ultimate criterion of social
good).
87. See Rescher, supra note 40, at 77 (stating that it is understandable why
economists, theorists, and their congeners are reluctant to get involved with bal-
ancing egalitarian principles and instead prefer to settle matter on basis of straight-
forward and mechanical considerations such as those of Pareto Principle).
88. See Posner, supra note 2, at 15 (discussing Pareto Principle and stating that
although economist's competence in discussion of legal system is limited, econo-
mists are able to predict effect of legal rules on value and efficiency, in their strict
technical senses, and on existing distribution of income and wealth).
89. See Mishan, supra note 33, at 4 (discussing principles of resource alloca-
tion). As noted in Section II above, under the Kaldor-Hicks principle, if the in-
crease in welfare of those who benefit from a change exceeds the decrease in
welfare from those who bear costs from the change, from a social cost-benefit per-
spective, the change is desirable.
[Vol. XII: p. 1
18
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol12/iss1/1
ECONOMIC THEORY
As many commentators validly pointed out, the Kaldor-Hicks princi-
ple does not require actual compensation by "gainers" to "losers"
for policy changes.90 Rather, the principle merely (and unsatisfac-
torily, in detractors' views) requires that those who benefit could, if a
system of perfect transfers existed, compensate those who lose.91
Therefore, a standard criticism of the Kaldor-Hicks principle is that,
even though potential social welfare could be increased, some indi-
viduals or groups might be made significantly worse off.92
The criticism that the Kaldor-Hicks compensation criterion
does not require actual compensation validly highlights the princi-
ple's shortcomings as an instrument for social decision-making.93
Ultimately, the concern about compensation highlights the impor-
tance of distributive measures and raises fundamental questions
about the appropriate mechanism for addressing perceived
inequities.
B. Realism of Fundamental Economic Assumptions
A number of critics challenged the validity of economic theory
on the basis that its underlying assumptions are unrealistic and un-
tenable.94 These criticisms are generally directed at some of the
institutional and behavioral assumptions noted in Section II and, in
particular, the assumption that economic agents act in a self-inter-
ested, rational manner. 95
These criticisms appear to reflect a lack of understanding re-
garding the nature of theoretical analysis. Assumptions are neces-
90. See Posner, supra note 2, at 14 (pointing out that policy changes under
Kaldor-Hicks principle can occur "regardless of whether or not compensation was
paid").
91. See id. (pointing out that under Kaldor-Hicks concept, winners could com-
pensate losers, whether or not they actually do so).
92. See Mishan, supra note 33, at 257 (discussing maxims of normative alloca-
tion economics). An obvious extension of this point is that the Kaldor-Hicks com-
pensation test ignores distributive effects. See Posner, supra note 2, at 17. This
criticism is discussed in Section IV(i) (b) below.
93. See Mishan, supra note 33, at 5 (claiming that Kaldor-Hicks principle is
capable of self-contradiction).
94. See Posner, supra note 2, at 29 (pointing out that economic analysis of law
arouses considerable antagonisms). Posner discusses several criticisms of eco-
nomic analysis of law: 1) economics is reductionist and lawyers and judges do not
speak its language; 2) the normative underpinnings of the economic approach are
so repulsive that it is inconceivable that the legal system would embrace them; 3)
the economic approach to law manifests a conservative political bias; and 4) that
the economic approach to law is criticized for ignoring "justice." See id.
95. For a discussion of the subjective values upon which neoclassical eco-
nomic assumptions are founded, see R.P. Malloy, A New Law and Economics, in LAw
AND ECONOMICs: NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES at 15-18.
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sary in economics as well as within other fields of social and
scientific inquiry for the obvious reason that some degree of ab-
straction is necessary to advance understanding of complex reali-
ties. 96 Indeed, a theory that sought to reproduce in its assumptions
the complexity of reality would lose its explanatory import and be-
come merely a description.97 Thus, by founding analytical models
on certain simplified behavioral attributes, economics enhances its
ability to describe and explain particular phenomena and to pre-
dict outcomes. Ultimately, arguments that attack the validity of eco-
nomics on the basis of its basic assumptions are misguided because
they fail to recognize that theories should be judged primarily on
the basis of their descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive
contributions.
C. Valuation of the Environment
In addition to criticizing underlying principles and assump-
tions, critics attack the evaluation of economic costs and benefits in
environmental decision-making.98 The subtleties of the extensive
debate on environmental cost-benefit analysis make extensive re-
view tenuous. As a result, after briefly outlining some dominant
approaches used in cost-benefit analysis, this article will highlight
some of the alleged deficiencies identified by critics.
Cost-benefit analysis has three major uses: (1) to assess the eco-
nomic feasibility of particular projects; (2) to rank alternative in-
vestment projects; and (3) to optimize the scale of a given project.99
Thomas Cinti observed that "[t]he underlying assumption of cost
benefit analysis is that efficiency will be achieved when the marginal
benefit realized from a new technology is just equal to the marginal
cost incurred implementing it."100 Therefore, the ultimate objec-
96. See A. Mitchell Polinsky, AN INTRODUCTION To LAw AND ECONOMICS 2 (2d
ed. 1989) (discussing role of assumptions in economics).
97. See Posner, supra note 2, at 18 (discussing apparent unrealistic assump-
tions that underlie economic theory).
98. See Dr. Terrence S. Veeman, Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental Deci-
sion-Making: Procedures, Perils, and Promise, Address at Symposium sponsored by
the Society of Environmental Biologists Alberta Chapter (February 19 & 20, 1985),
in ECONOMY & ECOLOGY: THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 129
(1985) (contending that difficulties associated with cost-benefit analysis can be
overcome with greater sophistication in evaluating and greater attention to envi-
ronmental considerations).
99. See id. at 130 (contending that determination of economic feasibility is
primarily used method of cost-benefit analysis in North America).
100. Thomas A. Cinti, The Regulator's Dilemma: Should Best Available Technology
or Cost Benefit Analysis Be Used To Determine the Applicable Hazardous Waste Treatment,
Storage and Disposal Technology?, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 145, 155
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tive of cost-benefit analysis is to facilitate systematic decision-making
on the efficiency of resource allocation by identifying and assessing
the proposed project's impact on environmental, economic and
other interests.
The difficulty in evaluating potential impacts arises from the
need to value entities, such as the environment, for which no iden-
tifiable market exists. 10 1 Because of the absence of a market for
particular amenities, it is necessary for decision-makers to attach
values, defined in terms of how much people would be willing to
pay for the amenities if they were marketed. 10 2 The two main types
of approaches to non-market valuation in environmental cost-bene-
fit analysis are direct and indirect methods.10 3 Direct, or stated
preference, methods seek to infer individuals' opinions on environ-
mental quality by asking them to state their preferences for the en-
vironment.10 4 For example, one widely used type of direct method
is the contingent valuation method. This method may involve sur-
veying individuals about their preferences between different scena-
rios or, alternatively, asking them the maximum they are willing to
pay for an increase in environmental quality or to accept compensa-
tion for avoiding a decrease in environmental quality.10 5 In con-
trast to direct methods, indirect methods seek to derive values of
environmental costs and benefits by examining individuals' behav-
ior in related markets.' 0 6 Essentially, indirect methods focus on
(1990) (citing Smith, A Conceptual Overview of the Foundations of Benefit-Cost Analysis,
in BENEFIT ASSESSMENT: THE STATE OF THE ART 13 (1986)) (stating that cost benefit
analysis assumption is based on marginal allocation of resources and implementa-
tion of technology).
101. See Hanley et al., supra note 54, at 356-57 (discussing lack of market for,
and undervaluation of, environmental resources). Environmental resources pro-
vide both direct and indirect services. See id. But there is no private or public
market for them, and frequent mis-pricing or under-pricing of services requires
policy makers to use other methods to assess their value. See id.
102. See id. at 383-84 (introducing direct and indirect methods of valuing en-
vironmental resources using direct surveys or indirect observation of related mar-
kets to determine individuals' maximum "willingness to pay" for environmental
quality). For a critical discussion of methodologies which may be used by the
courts to assess environmental harm, see Ontario Law Reform Commission, The
Assessment of Damages for Harm to the Environment, in REPORT ON DAMAGEs FOR ENV-
RONMENTAL HARM (Ch. 3) (1990).
103. For a summary of both approaches, including outlines of different meth-
ods within each type and examples of applications, see Hanley et al., supra note 54,
at 383-424.
104. See Hanley et al., supra note 54, at 383 (describing direct or stated valua-
tion method).
105. See id. (discussing contingent valuation method). This method, while
controversial, was widely used. See id.
106. See id. at 404 (introducing indirect methods of valuation). For example,
the indirect methods "infer" the value that individuals place on environmental
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what individuals actually chose and what they had to forego in or-
der to obtain it. For example, in one type of indirect method of
non-market valuation, hedonic modeling, individuals' valuation of
air quality improvements is inferred by considering their behavior
in the related market for housing, particularly with respect to their
willingness to pay for site-specific amenities.' 0 7
As alluded to above, there is a difference between direct and
indirect methods. As V. K Smith observed, the difference between
the two approaches:
arises from what the analyst does in constructing the
choice elements. For indirect methods, the task parallels
'detective work' - trying to determine what people sought
and what they had to give up to get it. By contrast, for the
methods generally included under the broad heading of
contingent valuation this process requires the analyst to
present a credible, understandable and relevant choice
option. 108
Nonetheless, despite this difference, the underlying logic of direct
and indirect approaches to non-market valuation are the same, spe-
cifically, both involve developing a monetary measure of economic
value by reconstructing the elements of a choice and identifying the
tradeoff underlying each individual's decision. 10 9
Based in part on the common underlying logic of various ap-
proaches to non-market valuation, critics argue that cost-benefit
analysis has systematic limitations that seriously undermine its valid-
ity in environmental decision-making processes.110 This criticism
resources by identifying what individuals pay to get to those resources and enjoy
them.
107. See id. at 411-16 (discussing hedonic pricing approach).
108. See Vincent Kerry Smith, Estimating Economic Values For Nature, in METH-
ODS FOR NON-MARKET VALUATION xiii-xiv (1996) (asserting that same basic logic
underlying contingent evaluation applies to indirect methods). In this particular
piece, the author uses the term "survey method" rather than "direct method." See
id. Close scrutiny of these terms reveals their synonymous nature. See id.; see also
Hanley et al., supra note 54, at 383-418 (evaluating methods for valuation).
109. See Smith, supra, note 108, at xiii (discussing fundamental similarities be-
tween direct and indirect approaches to non-market valuation). "An object of
choice can be anything an individual wishes to acquire. It defines ... whatever is
obtained from an implicit tradeoff inherent in a choice." See id. at n.1.
110. In addition to the criticisms examined in this article, other criticisms of
cost-benefit analysis include: (1) the potential for strategic bias in contingent valu-
ation studies, (2) the potential for "embedding," in which the value placed on a
good in a contingent valuation study depends on the extent that it is embedded in
other goods, and (3) the sensitivity of preference models to changes in an individ-
ual's information. These criticisms are largely recognized by economists, and con-
[Vol. XII: p. I
22
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol12/iss1/1
ECONOMIC THEORY
includes the views that: (1) the application of cost-benefit analysis is
too broad from an environmental ethics perspective; (2) the identi-
fication of costs and benefits is seriously undermined by scientific
uncertainty; (3) the attempt to assign values discounts less easily
assessed non-pecuniary values; (4) cost-benefit analyses are founded
on inaccurate assumptions about the way in which people value
gains and losses; (5) the process of attempting to make non-mar-
keted entities "monetary" results in their devaluation; and (6) cost-
benefit analysis fails to address issues of equitable distribution.
First, cost-benefit analysis is attacked on ethical grounds. In
essence, criticisms based on environmental ethics perspectives chal-
lenge the moral foundations of cost-benefit analysis. Two illustra-
tive examples of ethical criticisms are outlined briefly here. First,
some commentators attacked cost-benefit analyses on the basis that
there are many instances, including in environmental regulation,
where a decision may be morally right even though its benefits do
not outweigh its costs.111 Steve Kelman, for example, argued that
although there is a broad range of individual and social decisions
where it is sufficient to consider whether an act's benefits exceed its
costs, certain questions of moral judgment involve the natural envi-
ronment and should remain outside the purview of cost-benefit
analysis. 112 Kelman claimed:
[F] or the common run of questions facing individuals and
societies, it is possible to begin and end our judgment sim-
ply by finding out if the benefits of the contemplated act
outweigh the costs. This very fact means that one way to
show the great importance, or value, attached to an area is
to say that decisions involving the area should not be de-
termined by cost-benefit calculations. This applies, I
think, to the view many environmentalists have of deci-
sions involving our natural environment.113
siderable attention and debate was devoted to attempting to address those
concerns.
111. See Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Citique, in PEOPLE,
PENGUINS, AND PLASTIc TREES 384-85 (Christine Pierce & Donald VanDeVeer eds.,
2d ed. 1995) (demonstrating, by example of truth-telling, that some decisions are
morally right even if their costs exceed their benefits).
112. See id. at 386-87 (discussing incorporation of value judgments in cost-
benefit analysis, and suggesting that subjecting environmental decisions to cold
calculation blocks influence of values that initially spawned environmental
concern).
113. Id. at 387.
2001]
23
Jutlah: Economic Theory and the Environment
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2001
24 VILLANoVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
Thus, environmental cost-benefit analysis is criticized on the ethical
basis that the natural environment should be outside the range of
such calculations.
Secondly, another ethical criticism of cost-benefit analysis is
based on its anthropocentric nature. For example, Douglas Booth
argued that ". .under an ethics of environmental concern the
scope of possible cases where cost-benefit analysis can be legiti-
mately applied from an ethical point of view is narrower than com-
monly believed by environmental economists." 114 Clearly, these
ethical critiques of environmental economics are important be-
cause they raise fundamental issues about our relationships with
other natural entities and suggest that economically irrational
choices may sometimes be "right." It is well beyond the scope of
this article to attempt to reconcile these widely diverging views
about humanity's proper sphere of activity. Nonetheless, despite
the significance of ethical critiques of cost-benefit analysis, such cri-
tiques do not address the pressing practical issue of how to resolve
competing interests affecting the environment.
The second basis for attacks on a cost benefit analysis is the
observations that the costs and benefits of a project are seriously
undermined by scientific uncertainty. Ted Schrecker's observations
concerning the obstacles in identifying the benefits of health and
safety regulations are also illustrative of critics' concerns within the
broader environmental context:
An extensive recent review of research on the benefits of
health and safety regulation isolated several areas of scien-
tific uncertainty or conflict: the demonstration of cause-
effect relationships; limited availability of epidemiological
data linking exposures with actual human illness; the limi-
tations of models used to predict dispersion of pollutants
within the environment; dose-response relationships; the
validity of interspecies extrapolation; and the extent of im-
114. Douglas E. Booth, Ethics and The Limits Of Environmental Economics, 9 Eco-
LOGICAL ECON. 241, 241 (1994) (discussing environmental ethics in context of hu-
manity as focus of moral concern). Booth analyzed two approaches to
environmental ethics: the first is based on the view that human beings are the
focus of moral concern; and the other is based on the notion that moral concern
can also be extended to non-human entities. See id. Booth concluded that if
human beings alone are the focus of moral concern, the application of cost-benefit
analysis to environmental issues is illegitimate in cases where environmental dam-
age is harmful to human health and where the natural environment is so highly
valued that compensation to those who suffer loss is infeasible. See id. at 249-50.
Further, Booth found that cost-benefit analysis cannot legitimately be applied
where moral concern is extended to non-human entities. See id.
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pacts on especially sensitive individuals or groups. [Foot-
note omitted.] 115
On the basis of these and similar concerns relating to the identifica-
tion of environmental impacts, critics argue that the efficacy of cost-
benefit analysis in addressing environmental issues is seriously
flawed.
Considerable informational limitations face both policy-makers
and others seeking to address environmental problems. However,
the practical reality of imperfect information does not mean that an
attempt to identify the implications of a proposed project should
not be made. Rather, in the absence of perfect knowledge, cost-
benefit analysts should attempt to make known all scientific uncer-
tainties or assumptions on which the assessment is known based ex-
plicitly.116 Express recognition of the limitations of the analysis
would improve its process, albeit not necessarily its substantive con-
tent, in two ways. First, express recognition of the scientific short-
comings and underpinnings of cost-benefit analyses would help
address the concern that such analyses are misleading. Second,
those involved in the development of environmental policy, includ-
ing the scientific community, would have a clearer understanding
of the areas in which further research is required. Thus, as argued
here, the most appropriate way of dealing with scientific uncer-
tainty in cost-benefit analysis is to expressly recognize the areas of
uncertainty, but not to altogether reject the process of striving to
consider costs and benefits in environmental decision-making.
Third, in addition to criticism surrounding the broad applica-
tion of cost benefit analysis and the identification of impacts, critics
attack the second primary stage of cost-benefit analysis, the assign-
ment of values to identified costs and benefits.11 7 One persistent
criticism is that cost-benefit analysis distorts or discounts less easily
assessed non-pecuniary values. 118 The implication of this is that
non-marketed "goods", such as the environment, are undervalued
115. T.F. Schrecker, Political Economy of Environmental Hazards, Study Paper
prepared for the LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, 48 (1984).
116. See generally id. and accompanying text (discussing practical uncertainties
underlying cost-benefit analysis).
117. See id. at 49. Once benefits are estimated, a value is attached to them,
which is determined by how much people are willing to pay for the benefits if they
are marketed. See id. This is the most cited problem of cost-benefit analysis -
assigning dollar values to benefits that are not normally the subject of market
transactions. See id.
118. See P.C. Schulze, Cost-benefit Analyses and Environmental Policy, 9 ECOLOGI-
cAL ECON. 197, 197-98 (1994).
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in decisions relating to use or protection. '1 9 Critics argue that non-
pecuniary values in planning decisions, litigation and reform pro-
posals are discounted relative to more easily appreciated and mea-
sured financial data. 120
It is not disputed here that cost-benefit analysis is better able to
deal with values that are already or easily quantified. However, be-
cause of the varied and important uses of this type of inquiry in
social decision-making, critics of cost-benefit analysis must first es-
tablish that cost-benefit analysis systematically results in unjust out-
comes before rejecting the process. 12 1 At present, the claim that
cost-benefit analysis is systematically unjust is not founded on com-
pelling empirical foundation.
Fourth, another criticism of cost-benefit analysis, which is re-
lated to the issue of valuation, is that such analyses are founded on
inaccurate assumptions about the way people value gains and
losses. 122 Under standard economic theory, an item has value only
to the extent that people are willing to give up something in order
to acquire or keep it.123 In neoclassical welfare economic theory,
individuals' willingness to pay for an increase in welfare and their
willingness to accept compensation to avoid a decrease in welfare
are viewed as equivalent ways of measuring either a decrease or an
increase in welfare.' 24 Critics argue that the assumption that peo-
ple equally value avoided losses and a foregone gain is false.
Rather, they argue that increasing evidence shows that people gen-
119. See generally Smith, supra note 108 (discussing how values for environ-
ment are constructed from people's choices); see also Kelman, supra note 111, at
387. One criticism is that people have different preferences and are subject to
different constraints as they make their choices. See id. For example, the dollar
value imputed to the non-market goods that most people would wish to avoid will
be lower than otherwise, because people with a weak aversion to these goods or
strong constraints on their choices will be willing to take the good at less of a
discount than the average person. See id.
120. See J.L. Knetsch, Economics, Losses, Fairness, and Resource-Use Conflicts, in
GROWING DEMANDS ON A SHRINKING HERITAGE: MANAGING RESOURCE-USE CON-
FLic-rs, 20, 23 (M. Ross & J.O. Saunders, eds., 1992); see also Kelman, supra note
111, at 387-88
121. See H.B. Leonard & R.J. Zeckhauser, Cost-Benefit Analysis Defended, in PEO-
PLE, PENGUINS, AND PLASTIc TREES, 249, 252 (D. VanDeVeer & C. Pierce, eds.,
1986).
122. See Kelman, supra note 111, at 388. Another problem with cost-benefit
calculations is that the attempts of economists to measure people's willingness to
pay for non-marketed goods assumes that there is no difference between the price
a person would require for giving something up to which they have a preexisting
right and the price they would pay to gain something to which he has no right. See
id.
123. See Knetsch, supra note 120, at 25.
124. See Hanley et al., supra note 54, at 395.
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erally value losses more than equivalent gains, and reductions in
losses more highly than foregone gains. Steve Kelman argued:
[T]he attempts of economists to measure people's willing-
ness to pay for non-marketed things assume that there is
no difference between the price a person would require
for giving up something to which he has a preexisting right
and the price he would pay to gain something to which he
enjoys no right. Thus, the analysis assumes no difference
between how much a homeowner would need to be paid
in order to give up an unobstructed mountain view that he
already enjoys and how much he would be willing to pay
to get an obstruction moved once it is already in place.
Available evidence suggests that most people would insist
on being paid more to assent to a worsening of their situa-
tion than they would be willing to pay to improve their
situation. [Italics in original.] 125
Thus, critics maintain that, in attempting to value non-marketed
goods, economists ignore the disparity between people's assessment
of positive and negative changes in economic well-being. 126 Moreo-
ver, critics claim that this disparity can often seriously undermine
the efficacy of cost-benefit analysis. 127
Fifth, cost-benefit analysis is fundamentally attacked on the ba-
sis that the very act of attempting to make environmental and other
non-marketed values "monetary," results in their devaluation. Pro-
ponents of this view claim that the act of pricing may decrease value
for two main reasons. First, in many circumstances, non-market ex-
change is linked to the creation of certain values not associated with
market exchange. 128 As a result, "[i]f a good becomes less associ-
ated with the production of positively valued feelings because of
market exchange, the perceived value of the good declines to the
extent that those feelings are valued."1 29 In addition, pricing may
125. See Kelman, supra note 111, at 385. The difference arises from such fac-
tors as being accustomed to and psychologically attached to that preexisting right.
See id.
126. See id. at 387 (noting inconsistency between people's assessment of posi-
tive and negative changes in economic well-being, which should be taken into ac-
count when valuing non-marketed goods).
127. See id.
128. See id. at 389 (noting how spontaneity and various other feelings come
from personal relationships).
129. Id. at 389. In the environmental context it can be seen in many instances
such as streams or forests: for the people who ascribe value to them, part of their
value comes from their positions as repositories of values, which the non-market
sector represents. See id.
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decrease value because value of non-marketed objects is based
partly on the objects' positions as repositories of values represented
by the non-marketed sector.130 Second, proponents of the view that
the act of pricing may decrease value claim that the value of a good
purportedly may decrease by removing the possibility of announc-
ing that the item is "not for sale." 131 Moreover, when an object is
priced, the issue of its perceived value constantly arises, which may
lead to the erosion of individuals' assessment of the object's
worth. 132 On these grounds, some argue that economic valuation
of non-marketed objects can result in their devaluation.
The view that the assignment of economic value to a non-mar-
keted item may result in its devaluation, however, is based on the
premise that non-marketed sectors yield special value to humans.
Proponents of the argument assert that pricing per se may reduce
value and, therefore, place central, but implicit, importance on a
dichotomy between the marketed and non-marketed sectors.
Nonetheless, their argument does not provide any insight into the
origins of the boundaries of these sectors. In other words, the argu-
ment fails to address the basic issue of why markets exist and the
source of economic value. Consequently, the argument that pric-
ing per se reduces value is considerably undermined by its implicit
and undefended assumption that markets and prices are necessary
for economic value. Conversely, as Steven Edwards observed:
Indifference is the cornerstone of rigorous definitions of
economic values. Something's economic value - whether
it be a marked commodity, an unpriced environmental re-
source, or sympathy for future generations - is determined
entirely by its ability to yield personal utility. [M]arkets
and prices are not necessary conditions for economic
value. Rather, markets and prices emerge from collective
economic behavior when people can be excluded from
the use and benefits of things unless they pay for them.
Traditional markets and prices provide only one mecha-
130. See Kelman, supra note 111, at 389 (pointing out that this seems certainly
to be case for things in nature, such as pristine streams or undisturbed forests).
131. See id. (discussing how stating that something is not for sale affirms, en-
hances, and protects thing's value in number of ways).
132. See id. The marker "not-for-sale" enhances a resources value. See id.
That marker shows that a resource is valued for its own sake, whereas selling a
resource for money demonstrates that the resource's value is only based on its
inherent worth. Secondly by saying something cannot be transferred places it in
the exceptional category. See id.
[Vol. XII: p. 1
28
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol12/iss1/1
ECONOMIC THEORY
nism whereby these values are revealed. Limiting eco-
nomics to the analysis of traditional markets is arbitrary. 133
Therefore, as illustrated above, cost-benefit analysis raises funda-
mental issues about the nature of economic value. Moreover, the
argument that the assignment of economic values to non-marketed
items may result in their devaluation ignores the basis of economic
value, and is premised on the untenable assumption that the divi-
sion between marketed and non-marketed sectors is rigid and static.
Finally, cost-benefit analysis is criticized on the basis that it fails
to address the social problems associated with inequitable distribu-
tions of costs and benefits. Critics argue that the Kaldor-Hicks prin-
ciple, which requires that any change resulting in a positive net
benefit to society, incorrectly assumes that those who bear costs
under one decision will eventually benefit from another.13 4 Hence,
they claim that the principle assumes that, over the long run, every-
one will ultimately benefit sufficiently to compensate for their
losses.13 5 In their view, the position that "losers" under one policy
will be "winners" under another is false because the analysis de-
pends upon the existing wealth and entitlement distributions in so-
ciety.136 As Cinti stated, cost-benefit analysis usually fails to
consider the entitlements of the parties, even though "the initial
asset positions of the parties can affect the outcome of the analysis
if the cost is great enough to be a substantial portion of the non-
entitled party's asset position."137 On this basis, critics claim that
the Kaldor-Hicks principle, which is central to cost-benefit analysis,
ignores distribution effects. 138
There are two compelling responses to the criticism that cost-
benefit analysis accords insufficient attention to distribution issues.
First, the charge has little to do specifically with the methodology of
cost-benefit analysis. In principle, there is no reason why equitable
133. S. Edwards, In Defense of Environmental Economics, 9 ENVTL. ETHICS 73, 76-
77 (1987).
134. These criticisms closely parallel the criticisms that the Kaldor-Hicks prin-
ciple does not require actual compensation of "losers" by "gainers." See Cinti, supra
note 100, at 160 n.96. The Kaldor-Hicks principle also assumes that "losses" and
"wins" will "tend to even out" as the process is perpetuated again and again. See id.
This latter criticism was discussed in Section IV(i) (b) above.
135. See Cinti, supra note 100, at 160-61 (weighing ultimate benefits against
losses).
136. See id. (attempting to apply criticism in context of environmental
matters).
137. Id. at 161-62.
138. See id. at 160 (characterizing this particular criticism as also conflict be-
tween efficiency and equity).
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concerns cannot be incorporated into the cost-benefit decision
framework.13 9 Rather, the issue of distribution is closely related to
the identification and weighing of costs and benefits, and these
concerns should reflect society's view of the relative merit of com-
peting interests. Thus, there is no theoretical reason why distribu-
tion concerns could not be systematically included in cost-benefit
analyses.
Second, even if distribution concerns could not be systemati-
cally included in cost-benefit analyses, there are other means, such
as taxes and direct expenditures, to address inequities caused by
changes in policy. Thus, although decision-makers should include
distributional issues in their assessments of costs and benefits, other
wider public programs exist to effect redistribution if project-based
efforts are not fully effective. Some proponents of cost-benefit anal-
ysis have argued it is generally not a good idea to attempt to address
distribution concerns in cost-benefit analysis, and that alternate
means are more efficient for redistribution. 140 However, it seems
that efforts to address distribution concerns should also occur at
the project-based level because it is at this level that stakeholders
can present information with sufficient detail and focus to ensure
the project's ramifications can be more clearly understood.
Thus, the argument that cost-benefit analysis accords insuffi-
cient attention to distributive issues validly highlights the impor-
tance of equitable considerations. However, the argument does not
seriously undermine the methodology of cost-benefit analysis be-
cause there is no reason, in principle, why such concerns could not
be included in a cost-benefit analysis. Furthermore, even though
every effort should be made to include distribution issues in pro-
ject-based cost-benefit analyses, distributional concerns may also be
addressed in broader public programs.
139. See id. at 161-62 (stating Kaldor-Hicks principle assumes frictionless econ-
omy). As Cinti also acknowledged, the criticism that plays into a cost-benefit analy-
sis is affected by, but usually fails to consider, that the initial asset positions of the
parties can be largely mooted by considering the purpose of environmental legisla-
tion. See id. Cinti also suggested that because the express purpose of most envi-
ronmental legislation is to protect "human health and/or the environment," the
effects of the prior distribution of wealth are lessened substantially. See id. at 162.
140. For example, some commentors argue that only one tax and expendi-
ture package should be used to address equitable concerns because: (1) efforts to
address distribution issues within cost-benefit analysis would be inefficient; (2)
treating distributional concerns within each project would lead to transfers within
a small subset of the community; and (3) the view that distributional issues should
be addressed on an individual project basis reflects an unsubstantiated presump-
tion that some groups systematically lose out more than others. See Leonard &
Zeckhauser, supra note 121, at 250-51.
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In sum, as outlined in the foregoing section, the economic ap-
proach to environmental issues is criticized on a number of
grounds. This section examined three groups of criticism, includ-
ing: (1) the criteria for social efficiency, specifically, the Pareto and
Kaldor-Hicks principles; (2) the realism of fundamental economic
assumptions; and (3) valuation of the environment through cost-
benefit analysis. Only some of these criticisms are valid, and as
noted above, such criticisms involve: (1) concerns with limitations
of efficiency principles with respect to distributive equity and com-
pensation; (2) ethical questions about the moral foundations of
cost-benefit analysis; and (3) concerns about traditionally inaccu-
rate assumptions about the way in which people value gains and
losses. All of the examined criticisms, even those that are not com-
pelling, are important because they help put the field of economics
in perspective relative to other social concerns.14'
V. CONCLUSION
In attempting to demonstrate the general environmental rele-
vance of economics, this paper seeks to achieve three main goals.
First, it attempts to justify the use of economics in analyzing the law.
As discussed above, economics can contribute to our understanding
of law by providing a necessary external perspective, clarifying value
conflicts by demonstrating the inefficiency of particular types of ac-
tivities and placing values, albeit imperfectly, on environmental
goods. Second, this paper strives to provide a broad overview of
welfare economics and environmental economics, in particular, to
highlight the meaning and centrality of the concept of social effi-
ciency in these fields. As outlined above, welfare economics seeks
to maximize social welfare, measured in terms of aggregate individ-
ual utility. Yet, the existence of externalities is a significant reason
within the environmental context, for failing to achieve a socially
optimal allocation of resources. Finally, a third main objective of
this paper is to outline and respond to the criticisms of an eco-
nomic approach to environmental law. Ultimately, this paper en-
deavors to illustrate that, despite some important criticisms,
economics remains a useful approach to analyzing environmental
issues.
141. This paper does not purport to provide a response to all of the criticisms
examined. Rather, notwithstanding the criticisms, this paper has sought to
demonstrate the general relevance of economics to environmental law and policy.
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